{"id":33749,"date":"2018-02-19T21:18:49","date_gmt":"2018-02-19T20:18:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.burks.de\/burksblog\/?p=33749"},"modified":"2018-02-19T21:50:01","modified_gmt":"2018-02-19T20:50:01","slug":"die-jagd-auf-den-regenbogen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.burks.de\/burksblog\/2018\/02\/19\/die-jagd-auf-den-regenbogen","title":{"rendered":"Die Jagd auf den Regenbogen"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Rainbow\"<\/a>
\nFoto: Burks 2008<\/sup><\/p>\n

Alles Irdische ist eitel. (Die Bibel, Prediger<\/a>)<\/i><\/p>\n

Ich empfehle den intelligenten und des sophisticated Englischen kundigen Leserinnen und den klugen und an Wissenschaft interessierten Lesern den Artikel<\/a> „Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being“ (verdammt schwierig). Vielleicht vorher noch einen kurzen Abstecher zum Spiegeltest<\/a> und zur Binokularen Rivalit\u00e4t<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that \u201cconsciousness\u201d contains no top-down control processes and that \u201cconsciousness\u201d involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it.<\/i><\/p>\n

Das ist nat\u00fcrlich Gift f\u00fcr die Moraltheologie. Ich habe mir Wikipedia \u00fcber Bewusstsein<\/a> durchgelesen. Wenn man es auf den Punkt bringen will: Wir haben immer noch keine Ahnung. (Die Frage m\u00fcsste auch sein, was eigentlich die richtige Frage dazu ist. Eine Zwischen\u00fcberschrift lautet denn auch: „Anthropomorphism and the Search for Meaning“.)<\/p>\n

In our account, we take this argument to its logical conclusion and propose that \u201cconsciousness\u201d although temporally congruent involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it.<\/i><\/p>\n

Au weia. Jetzt wird es hart. Gef\u00e4llt mir aber, in dem Sinn: Alle anderen Wissenschaftler hatten bisher Unrecht.<\/p>\n

A key feature of our account (…) is that it does not set out to offer an explanation for the subjective \u201cexperience of consciousness\u201d but rather to highlight what we consider to be the fundamental misconception rooted in everyday experience and embedded in the powerful folk-view of the nature of \u201cconsciousness.\u201d Central to our view (…) is the simple proposition that all neuropsychological processing takes place independently of the experience of \u201cconsciousness.\u201d This is not to deny the powerful and ubiquitous existence of \u201cconscious experience\u201d but rather to claim that all executive psychological processes irrespective of how quickly and intuitively causally they might appear, actually reflect background neuropsychological activity that takes place in non-conscious systems. As noted earlier, to avoid unwanted associations embedded in traditional accounts of \u201cconsciousness\u201d we have choosen to use the terms \u201cpersonal narrative\u201d and personal \u201cawareness\u201d in our account in place of \u201ccontents of consciousness\u201d and \u201cexperience of consciousness.\u201d (…) We describe the process of generating this personal narrative as Internal Broadcasting.<\/i><\/p>\n

Die neurophysiologischen Prozesse, die im Gehirn ablaufen, haben also nichts oder nur wenig mit dem zu tun, was wir als „Bewusstsein“ bezeichnen. In der Zusammenfassung hei\u00dft es:
\nWe take no issue with the experiential primacy or reality of personal awareness and the related powerful sense of agency and self, that we all feel. We argue, however, that central to the traditional domain of \u201cconsciousness\u201d is a personal narrative created by and within inaccessible, non-conscious brain systems where personal awareness is no more than a passive accompaniment to this process. In this view, both the personal narrative and the associated personal awareness are end-products of widely distributed, efficient, non-conscious processing that arrives too late in the psychological process cycle for there to be a reason to infer the necessity of an additional independent executive or causal capacity to either of them.<\/i><\/p>\n

Ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob ich alles richtig verstanden habe, aber wenn ja, dann k\u00f6nnte man das Ergebnis wahrhaft in die sch\u00f6ne Metapher kleiden: Was wir meinen zu sei, ist so real wie ein Regenbogen.<\/p>\n

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