{"id":21868,"date":"2014-01-24T13:40:53","date_gmt":"2014-01-24T12:40:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.burks.de\/burksblog\/?p=21868"},"modified":"2014-01-24T13:40:53","modified_gmt":"2014-01-24T12:40:53","slug":"tor-the-bad-guys-and-the-good-guys","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.burks.de\/burksblog\/2014\/01\/24\/tor-the-bad-guys-and-the-good-guys","title":{"rendered":"Tor, the bad guys and the good guys"},"content":{"rendered":"

Heise<\/a>: „Forscher von der schwedischen Karlstad University sind bei einer systematischen Analyse des Tor-Netzwerks (PDF)<\/a> auf 20 Exit-Nodes gesto\u00dfen, die verschl\u00fcsselte Verbindungen angreifen.“
\nSeveral hundred Tor exit relays together push more than 1 GiB\/s of network traffic<\/a>. However, it is easy for exit relays to snoop and tamper with anonymised network traffic and as all relays are run by independent volunteers, not all of them are innocuous. (…) To reduce the attack surface users are exposed to, we further discuss the design and implementation of a browser extension patch which fetches and compares suspicious X.509 certificates over independent Tor circuits. Our work makes it possible to continuously monitor Tor exit relays.<\/i><\/p>\n

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